- Introduction
- Research
- Writing
- Curriculum Vitae
- Teaching
- Galleries
- Contact
Welcome
Thanks for visiting my site. I've set this up to offer an introduction to my work, as both a photographer and a philosopher.
Start with philosophy. I'm a political philosopher, trained in analytical political theory, with a special interest in the international dimensions of politics. My D.Phil., which was examined and passed by David Rodin and Jeff McMahan in February 2009, was on the ethics of war.You can read about the thesis by clicking the 'research' panel above, and you can read about my published writing in the 'writing' panel. I'm now a research associate at the institute for ethics, law and armed conflict at Oxford, perhaps the foremost research institute in its field. You can read about it here.My CV is available on the third tab, and will tell you anything else you need to know about my career.
I love political philosophy, the ideas that I'm working with trouble me in almost everything that I do, and it's an incredibly creative, collaborative, rewarding experience, especially at Oxford. It's not all that I do, however, I'm also a keen photographer. I started out with travel photography, and am always looking to expand my portfolio. I also have a business, selling my panoramic pictures of Oxford (and some other places), which I started in April 2008. From March to September 2009, I travelled around Africa with my wife, Lu, on public transport from Agadir in Morocco to Zagazig in Egypt, stopping at a town beginning with every letter of the alphabet on the way. You can read about our trip at www.alphabettravel.com. You can see a collection of all my photography at www.sethlazar.com.
Research
I recently finished my doctoral thesis in political theory, researching the role that associative duties—that is, duties owed in virtue of our special relationships with family, friends, and perhaps compatriots—might play in the the morality of war. The thesis is titled 'War and Associative Duties'.
The argument is set up in two parts. I start out by criticising a particular view of the ethics of war, according to which some wars can be fought without many rights being violated, at least by the justified side. The tradition of just war theory, and contemporary philosophers who ground the ethics of war in principles of self-defence, have generally concurred on this view, but I think it's a mistake. Obviously, in most wars many noncombatants will be killed, whether intentionally, recklessly, or even when due care is taken. I think these people suffer violations of their rights. But I am also sceptical about attempts to show that even combatants on the unjustified side lose their rights to life: after all, your rights to life are a fundamental part of your moral status, to be the sort of being it's not wrong to kill is to be the same as a mosquito, or a wasp, not a person. Philosophers have tried to argue that combatants are responsible for the wars they fight, but many soldiers fight with the reasonable belief—in conditions of radical uncertainty and great risk—that their cause is justified. Ultimately, it's a matter of luck which side you're on (not in all cases, of course). And I don't think moral status should be vulnerable to fluctuations in luck.
So, if warfare is always a necessarily duty-breaching endeavour, then should we just be pacifists, and forego all wars? While I think this is a live possibility, there is an alternative: warfare might, in some cases, be all things considered justified, though it does involve breaches of duty. There may be other duties we have, which we would breach if we don't fight, and fighting might in fact be the lesser of two evils. What other duties, then, might play this role? In the second part of the thesis I explore the possibility that associative duties might be relevant to the justification of killing in war: we may have duties to protect our loved ones, friends, and political communities, and indeed people at large, the breach of which can in some cases be worse than breaching the duties involved in fighting a war.
Suppose, for example, your country has launched a war which you know to be unjust, and the enemy is justifiably launching air raids against your military installations. Those air raids will predictably cause a considerable number of foreseeable but unintended casualties, but, according to the standard view of the doctrine of double effect, that 'collateral damage' is justified. Suppose, however, that it is your family that will be affected—your son or daughter who will become collateral damage. Are you justified in firing Surface-to-Air Missiles at the incoming aircraft? I think that you may be, and the most plausible reason is that your associative duty to protect your family overrides your duty not to harm even justified attackers.
The supervisor of my D.Phil. thesis was Professor Henry Shue, one of the foremost philosophers in the ethics of international affairs. The examiners are David Rodin and Jeff McMahan, of Oxford and Rutgers.
I'm now working on turning the thesis into a book.
Publications
'Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self-Defense'
Combatants in war kill and maim perfect strangers, committing acts that would be, in almost any other context, paradigmatically unjust. Conventional just war theory holds that they can avoid injustice, provided they only kill those who threaten their lives. This permissive standard has been much criticised. In particular, some argue that combatants can only justly kill enemies who are responsible for an unjustified threat to their lives. Initially, it was thought that responsibility should rise to the level of culpability; this standard has proved too restrictive, however, as even unjustified combatants are often blameless for the threat they pose. Responding to this concern, Jeff McMahan, David Rodin, and others have proposed that mere agent responsibility is sufficient to establish liability—if combatants meet the minimum standards of responsible agency, and they acted voluntarily in creating the unjustified threat, then they can be liable to be killed, even if they are wholly blameless. McMahan in particular has developed a detailed defence of this position, arguing that where A's voluntary conduct—however blameless—imposes risks on B, A should lose his right not to bear the costs when those risks eventuate in B being forced to choose between their lives. In this paper, I set out and criticise McMahan's position, arguing in particular that agent responsibility for the imposition of risks does not adequately differentiate between A and B, since B will also be agent-responsible for imposing risks on A. In the absence of any asymmetry between A and B, there are no grounds for either becoming liable to be killed in self-defence. This relaxation of the standard of liability is, in my view, a retrograde step: potential combatants should not imagine that they can main and kill without injustice.
This paper was published in the July edition of Ethics, and can be viewed here.
'The Nature and Disvalue of Injury'
This paper explicates a concept of injury as right-violation, which can be used as a foundation for distinguishing between setbacks to interests that should, and should not, be the concern of justice, and as the object of a theory of corrective justice. It begins by introducing a hybrid theory of rights, grounded in (a) the mobilisation of our moral equality to (b) protect our most important interests, and shows how violations of rights are the concern of justice, while setbacks where one of the twin grounds of rights is defeated are not. It then looks more closely at the substantive moral components of injury, namely harm and wrong. It argues that, on the hybrid conception, harm and wrong are individually necessary and jointly sufficient components of injury, and that the disvalue of neither is reducible to the other—in particular, it is a mistake to make the disrespect identified by wrong into another damaged interest. Finally, it distinguishes between the public and private dimensions of injury, and makes some preliminary suggestions as to whether the probable remedy for these different dimensions should lie in criminal, distributive, or corrective justice.
This paper won Res Publica's 2008 postgraduate essay prize, and was published in their Autumn 2009 edition. You can view it here.
'Corrective Justice and the Possibility of Rectification'
In this paper, I ask how – and whether – the rectification of injury at which corrective justice aims is possible, and by whom it must be performed. I split the injury up into components of harm and wrong, and consider their rectification separately. First, I show that pecuniary compensation for the harm is practically plausible, because money acts as a mediator between the damaged interest and other interests. I then argue that this is also a morally plausible approach, because it does not claim too much for compensation: neither can all harms be compensated, nor can it be said when compensation is paid that the status quo ante has been restored. I argue that there is no conceptual reason for any particular agent paying this compensation. I then turn to the wrong, and reject three proposed methods of rectification. The first aims to rectify the wrong by rectifying the harm; the second deploys punitive damages; the third, punishment. After undermining each proposal, I argue that the wrong can only be rectified by a full apology, which I disaggregate into the admission of causal and moral responsibility, repudiation of the act, reform, and, in some cases, disgorgement and reparations, which I define as a good faith effort to share the burden of the victim’s harm. I argue, further, that only the injurer herself can make a full apology, and it is not something that can be coerced by other members of society. As such, whether rectification of the wrong can be a matter of corrective justice is left an open question.
This paper was published in the August 2008 edition of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, a philosophy journal published by Springer-Kluwer. If you're registered with can see it online here.
'Do Associative Duties Really not Matter?'
Associative duties are non-contractual duties owed in virtue of a valuable relationship. General duties are owed to people simply in virtue of their humanity. In this paper, I ask what should be done when we can perform either an associative duty or a general duty, but not both. There are two types of solutions to this question, which will be called compatibilist and incompatibilist. Compatibilist responses deny any real tension between associative and general duties, in two ways. The first, compossibilist, variant rejects the terms of the question, arguing that tradeoffs cannot occur, because each set of duties can be fully discharged without compromising the other. The second, generalist, variant of compatibilism concedes that sometimes tradeoffs may be necessary. However, it contends that these tradeoffs are always easily resolvable, because there is a clear priority ordering between the two sets of duties: general duties always trump their associative counterparts. Incompatibilist responses hold that associative and general duties are genuinely in tension with one another: that is, (1) contra the compossibilist, there will indeed be tradeoffs between associative and general duties, and (2) contra the generalist, sometimes the associative duty will win out. My aim, in this paper, is first to pinpoint the terrain on which the debate between these three positions should be held, and then to show that, once on that terrain, incompatibilism looks more plausible than the alternatives.
This paper was published, January 2009, in Journal of Political Philosophy. You can view it at their website here.
Curriculum Vitae: Seth Lazar
Seth Lazar. D.O.B. 8/12/1979
Nuffield College, Oxford, OX1 1NF
www.sethlazar.org.uk
+44 (0) 7540 467 768
AOS
Analytical political theory: war, global justice, climate change, social justice, freedom, rights/rights-violations, corrective justice, punishment.
Applied ethics: self-defence, killing, compensation, apology, special relationships, associative duties, love.
Normative ethics: value theory, partiality/impartiality, consequentialism.
AOC
Bioethics: abortion, euthanasia, resource-allocation, genetic therapy and enhancement.
History of political thought: J. S. Mill, just war theory, political theories of Hegel and Marx, Foucault, Derrida, postcolonial theory.
2006-2009
D.Phil. Politics (Political Theory), St Peter's College, Oxford
Thesis: 'War and Associative Duties'.
Supervisor: Professor Henry Shue.
Passed: March 2009. Chosen by the politics department as their candidate for the Political Studies Association Sir Ernest Barker prize for best thesis in political theory 2008-9. Winners will be announced shortly.
Examiners: Dr. David Rodin (Oxford) and Professor Jeff McMahan (Rutgers).
Feb. 26th 2009.
Summary: How should a potential combatant, considering whether or not to fight in a war, evaluate the death and destruction that he may wreak should he fight? Can he kill without breaching duties of justice? If not, can these breaches be overridden by some other consideration? My dissertation answers that killing in war is always unjust—in particular, it cannot be subsumed under principles of self-defence. It then suggests that, in some cases, these injustices might be overridden by the importance of our associative duties to protect those with whom we share special relationships: lovers, families, friends, comrades, and perhaps compatriots.
2004-2006
M.Phil. Politics (Political Theory), St Peter's College, Oxford
Passed with distinction—highest average M.Phil. mark in Politics department.
Thesis: 'A Critical Analysis of Corrective Justice' (74%, distinction is 70%).
Supervisor: Professor David Miller.
Summary: This dissertation investigates the moral foundations of corrective justice. It begins by discussing the nature and disvalue of the injuries that corrective justice seeks to rectify; it then presents an analysis of whether and how rectification can achieved, then offers an argument to justify going from one to the other.
2002-2003
Frank Knox Fellowship, Harvard University, Cambridge MA.
Research on Marxism, Development Studies, and Postcolonialism.
Supervisor: Dr. Pauline Peters.
1999-2002
BA (Hons) English, Wadham College, Oxford
First class honours. Fourth out of 263 candidates.
1998
Ipswich School, Ipswich
A grades in History, English, French and Russian (both language and literature) ‘A’ Levels, and distinctions in English and French ‘S’ Levels (higher qualifications). Top three in country for Russian.
2009-2011
Research Associate of the Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford.
2007-2009
Retained Lecturer in Political Theory, Pembroke College, University of Oxford
2009
'The Nature and Disvalue of Injury', Res Publica, Volume 15, Number 3, pp. 289-304.
Available at: http://www.springerlink.com/content/j31112260k2g1217
2009
'Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self-Defense', Ethics, Volume 19, Number 4, pp. 699-728.
Available at: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/605727
2009
'Debate: Do Associative Duties Really Not Matter?', Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 17, Number 1, pp. 90-101
Available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00329.x
2008
'Corrective Justice and the Possibility of Rectification', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Volume 11, Number 4, pp. 355-368
Available at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121644358/PDFSTART
2011
'Just War Theories', Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, Andrei Marmor (ed.), Routledge
Invited to write essay on War for Wiley-Blackwell's new International Encyclopaedia of Ethics.
2010
'War', International Encyclopaedia of Ethics, Hugh Lafollette (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell
Invited to write essay on Just War Theories, for collection also including original essays by, among others, John Finnis, Anthony Duff, Victor Tadros, Seana Shiffrin, Stephen Perry, John Tasioulas and Jeremy Waldron.
2009
Killing in War workshop, Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford
Convened workshop on Jeff McMahan's new book, featuring original papers by David Rodin, John Gardner, Yitzhak Benbaji, Cheyney Ryan, Larry May, Tony Coady, Cecile Fabre, and Henry Shue. Respondents were early-career academics. A special edition of a major journal is intended to result from the proceedings.
Aug. 23-24 2010
'Asymmetric Wars, International Relations, and the Just War Theory', Belgrade University, Serbia
Invited to present paper on asymmetric warfare.
Jun. 17-19 2010
Workshop on Ethics, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), Australia National University, Australia
May 11 2010
Centre for Ethics, Law and Public Affairs Seminar Series , University of Warwick
Invited to present paper on jus post bellum at workshop organised by Larry May.
Feb. 2 2010
Seminar Series , Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford
Invited to present paper on war and associative duties.
Oct. 7 2009
Proportionality and Noncombatant Immunity, Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford
Roundtable discussion with Jeff McMahan and Helen Frowe (Sheffield) on proportionality and noncombatant immunity in the context of humanitarian interventions.
Oct. 30 2008
Oxford and Princeton Global Norms/Global Justice Research Collaboration, University of Oxford
Presented 'Responsibility and Killing in War'. Discussant: Prof. Steven Lee.
May 13 2008
James Martin Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford
Presented 'War and Associative Duties' to the James Martin Advanced Research Seminar.
Feb. 18 2008
Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK
Presented 'On The Justification of Associative Duties' to Nuffield Political Theory Workshop.
Oct. 10 2007
SPIRE, Keele University
Presented 'The Right to Kill? A Critique of Jeff McMahan's Theory of Liability to Defensive Killing and its Application to War' to Political Theory Colloquium.
Dec. 27-30 2008
American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, Philadelphia
Presented 'Self-Defence and Risk: A Reply to McMahan'. Respondent: Prof. Rahul Kumar (Queen's, Canada).
Sep. 10-12 2008
'The Basis and Value of Equality', Manchester Workshops in Political Theory, University of Manchester
Presented ‘Do Associative Duties Really Not Matter?’.
Jul. 4-6 2008
Society for Applied Philosophy Conference, University of Manchester
Presented 'Risk and Responsibility: A Critique of Jeff McMahan's Theory of Liability to Defensive Killing'. Respondent: Prof. Jeff McMahan (Rutgers).
Mar. 27-29 2008
'Global Justice', Association of Legal and Social Philosophy Annual Conference, University of Nottingham
Presented 'The Right to Kill? A Critique of Jeff McMahan's Theory of Just Killing in War'.
Nov. 30-Dec. 1 2007
Harvard Graduate Conference in Political Theory, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Presented 'A Liberal Defence of Duties to Compatriots'.
Sep. 12-14 2007
'Beyond the Nation', School of Politics, International Studies & Philosophy, Queen's University, Belfast
Presented 'Duties to Compatriots and Scheffler's Distributive Objection'.
Sep. 3-5 2007
'Global Social Justice in Theory and Practice', Global Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Birmingham
Presented 'On the Voluntarist Objection to Duties to Compatriots'.
Jun. 28-30 2007
'Terrorism, Globalisation and Democracy', IPSA Political Philosophy Research Committee (RC31) Annual Meeting, University of London
Presented 'Nationalism, Terrorism, and Supreme Emergency'.
Apr. 19-21 2007
'Aliens and Nations', Association of Legal and Social Philosophy Annual Conference, Keele University
Presented 'Special Relationships, Particular Duties, and the Distributive Objection'.
2009
Res Publica Postgraduate Essay Prize, 2008
Prize (£100) awarded for my paper 'The Nature and Disvalue of Injury'.
2008
American Philosophical Association Graduate Travel Award
Prize ($300) awarded to assist with expenses of attending APA Eastern Division meeting.
2008
British International Studies Association Founders' Award
£400 prize awarded to assist with completion of my thesis.
2008
Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Conference Postgraduate Essay Prize
Prize awarded for my paper ‘Risk and Responsibility: A Critique of Jeff McMahan’s Theory of Liability to Defensive Killing’, judged best postgraduate essay at the conference. Covered all fees and expenses.
2008
Vice-Chancellors' Fund Award
Awarded on the basis of research of an 'exceptionally high standard'. £1650 towards maintenance for last six months of D.Phil. (standard award is £1000).
2007-2008
Department of Politics, Cyril Foster, Winchester and Norman Chester Funds
Scholarships totalling £1400 for conference attendance (ALSP 2007, IPSA, Birmingham, Belfast, SAP 2008, Manchester Workshops 2008, APA 2008).
2007-2008
St Peter's College, Tutor for Graduates Fund
£700 towards conference attendance (ALSP 2007, 2008, Harvard, SAP 2008, Manchester Workshops 2008, APA 2008).
2007
Social Science Division Teaching Excellence Award (Category A)
£1500 award funded by Higher Education Funding Council for England. Category A awards are for outstanding teaching and commitment to teaching, and are a result of student nomination. Only five were awarded in the Department of Politics and International Relations; I was the only graduate student to receive one. The award letter states: ‘The committee was impressed by the strong endorsement of your tutorial teaching, the very high quality of support you offer, your ability to motivate and challenge, and to inspire: "tutorial teaching at its best".’
2007
St Peter's College, Cairncross Academic Award
Graduate scholarship of £400 towards conference expenses (IPSA, Birmingham, Belfast).
2005-2008
Arts and Humanities Research Council, Doctoral Fellowship
Awarded three years of funding for tuition and maintenance.
2004-2006
St Peter's College and Department of Politics, Graduate Studentship
Full tuition and maintenance for 2004-5, commuted to £250 book price when superseded by AHRC award in 2005.
2002-2003
Harvard University, Frank Knox Fellowship
Prestigious scholarship totalling approx. $50,000 for year of study at Harvard.
2000-2002
Wadham College, Schools Prize and Junior Scholarship
Ad hoc prize awarded for scoring Wadham’s highest ever mark in finals extended essay (84%, first is 70%). Junior scholarship for first in preliminary exams.
2007-2009
Pembroke College, University of Oxford
Took sole responsibility for political theory teaching at Pembroke College. Designed and taught tutorial-based courses on War and Global Justice, Marx and Marxism, and the Final Honours School (FHS) course in Theory of Politics. Held revision seminars for Theory of Politics.
2006-2009
Regent’s Park College, St. Hugh’s College, St. Peter’s College, St. Hilda’s College, Wycliffe Hall, University of Oxford
Designed and taught tutorial-based courses in Theory of Politics (FHS), Ethics (FHS), War and Global Justice.
2006-2009
Oxford Overseas Study Course, Taylor University Oxford Programme, Oxford
Designed and taught tutorial-based courses in Ethics, Bioethics, Kantian Ethics, and War/Global Justice to visiting US students
1998-1999
Falcon College, Esigodini, Zimbabwe
Taught English literature to ‘A’ Level, English language, History, and French to ‘O’ Level. Coached rugby and cricket teams; started and ran a poetry society.
2006-present
Professional Photography, Web Design
Since April 2008 I have run my own business, selling prints of my panoramic photographs of Oxford and other places round England and the world. I sell in Oxford shops, and also from www.oxford-panoramas.co.uk, which I designed. Have good working knowledge of XHTML and CSS. Also do travel and wedding photography. My photographs have appeared in magazines, guidebooks, and a literary review. My main photography gallery is www.sethlazar.com.
2002–present
Travel
Since 2002 have travelled, with my wife Lu, to: Bangladesh, Belize, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India (three times), Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, the US, and Vietnam. In 2004 stayed in a town in Asia beginning with every letter of the alphabet. Just completed an African Alphabet, this time in order—from Agadir, Morocco, to Zagazig in Egypt. Between these two countries we visited: Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, DR Congo, Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Lesotho. See our blog, www.alphabettravel.com. My travel photography is at www.pbase.com/sethlazar.
2004
Charity Fundraiser, London
Spent six months working as a door-to-door fundraiser for development charities such as Action Aid, the Red Cross, and Oxfam. Led a team that raised a projected £300,000; personally raised over £130,000.
1999
Mbuya Nehanda Street Children’s Home, Marondera, Zimbabwe
Worked for two months as carer. Built a gym for the kids using concrete, buckets, and poles. Led exercise and play.
Professor Henry Shue, Senior Research Fellow Emeritus (active) Merton College, University of Oxford.
Professor Jeff McMahan, Philosophy Department, Rutgers, State University of New Jersey.
Dr. David Rodin, Co-Director, Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford
Professor David Miller, Official Fellow of Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
Professor Larry May, W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University and Professorial Fellow, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt and Australian National Universities
Professor Simon Caney, Fellow and Tutor in Politics, Magdalen College, University of Oxford.
Click here for the pdf version of my CV.
Teaching Materials
Political Theory Syllabus
War and Global Justice Syllabus
Ethics Syllabus
Ethics of Killing Syllabus
Bioethics Syllabus
Essay Writing Guide
Revision Guide
Galleries
You can view my pictures in different ways, depending what you're interested in. My travel photography is at www.sethlazar.com.
If it's my commercial photography you're interested in, you can see my collection of panoramic art prints of the Oxford skyline, at Oxford Panoramas. Go to that page if you want to see art prints of the dreaming spires. If you would like to see my Oxford framed canvas prints, then this is the gallery.
For vertical panoramas of the Radclife Camera, St Mary's Church, and Magdalen College, try here and here. If you would like to see Bamburgh Castle panoramic prints and Dunstanburgh Castle panoramic prints, then these are the links, here and here.
My Cornwall shots, from Kynance Cove, Mullion Cove, and Coverack Bay, can be found by following those links.
I also have global panoramas, from Dhaka, Bangladesh, to Spallumcheen, Canada. You can see them here.
I'll also be showcasing pictures on Lu and my blog for our African Alphabet trip, from March to September 2009. Check it out at www.alphabettravel.com.